On 28 April, President Barack Obama announced the replacement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates by the Director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Leon Panetta[1]. The departure of Mr. Gates comes as no surprise: he had agreed to remain at the head of the Pentagon on condition that he would be able to leave his post before the end of the President’s first term in office. However, it has set in motion a chain of reassignments which provides rich intelligence about how the administration operates and about the changes we may expect in American policy relating to national security. It also comes at a key moment in the Obama presidency. The success of the audacious clandestine operation which resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden constitutes a major personal success for Mr. Obama and is expected to considerably increase his stature as commander-in-chief.

As replacement of Mr. Panetta at the head of the CIA, President Obama has nominated General David Petraeus, who has been responsible for American military operations in  Afghanistan. Petraeus will be replaced by General John Allen. Lastly, the former U.S. Ambassador in Kabul and Baghdad, Ryan Crocker, has been chosen to be the new Ambassador in Afghanistan, replacing Karl Eikenberry. These changes have been presented to the Senate for confirmation and are expected to become effective in the coming months.

While President Obama has described this reshuffle as a sign of continuity[2], it nonetheless marks an important stage in his presidency. In order to compensate for his lack of experience, Barack Obama in effect acted like his predecessor and surrounded himself with a particularly experienced team. That is why he asked Robert Gates to stay on in his post and asked Hillary Clinton to become Secretary of State. To coordinate the process of shaping foreign policy, defence and security within the National Security Council, he named the retired four-star general James Jones, former Supreme Allied Commander. One must add to this Vice President Joe Biden, who was chosen largely because of his experience in foreign policy.

In order to better understand the extent of the reshuffle, we should look closely into the functioning and the peculiarities of this administration before we study in detail the changes announced.

1. Difficult relations between the White House and the military

Whereas the experience of the team put in place by President Obama was intended to compensate for his own lacunae in the area of national security, it tested his capabilities as manager. The discussions on withdrawal of troops from Iraq, on the new strategy in  Afghanistan and the revolts in the Arab world in fact underscored the dissensions which cut across the ‘team of rivals’[3]  selected by Mr. Obama. Though tension is quite normal, especially within an administration confronted with managing two wars, it is a rich source of intelligence on the correlation of forces behind the elaboration of President Obama’s national security policy.

            w Distrust between the White House and the military

The inexperience of a young Democratic president who based his campaign partly on opposition to the war in Iraq seems to have fed the skepticism of many high officers with regard to Barack Obama. His background probably revived in the Pentagon memories of the  tension which quickly set in after the arrival in the White House of another young Democratic president: Bill Clinton[4]. The questions of the military officers with respect to the new president showed through in their perception of their new boss. During their first meeting, just several days after Mr. Obama took office, several in fact had the impression of having before them a commander-in-chief who was ‘uncomfortable and intimidated.’[5]

For his part, President Obama and his closest advisers in matters of national security, Mark Lippert and Denis McDonough, seemed equally distrustful of the military officers and of their wish to increase American military presence in Afghanistan. During the open internal discussion of a new strategy for Afghanistan, the two main leaders of military operations in the country, Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, tried to pressure the White House to agree to send reinforcements. In an article signed by the editorial board member of the Washington Post Michael Gerson, also a former writer for President George W. Bush, it was reported that General Petraeus supported General McChrystal’s strategy of counter-insurgency, which required sending an additional 40,000 soldiers to Afghanistan. Without being able ‘to guarantee’ the success of this option, General Petraeus indicated that without additional resources, failure was certain.[6]

Several weeks later, during a conference in London, General McChrystal publicly criticised the option defended by Vice President Biden in the discussions on Afghan strategy. Without specifically naming him, General McChrystal indicated that he opposed any reduction of American military presence in Afghanistan, adding that a strategy which did not make it possible to stabilise the country was a ‘shortsighted’ [7]  strategy. These two incidents were very badly received by the President and his entourage, who were furious.[8] They contributed to growing distrust among those close to the President. On the other side, they raised the disdain of military officers for Mr. Obama’s advisers, all of whom came from his campaign team, and their tendency to understand presidential action solely from the standpoint of politics. In the work of journalist Bob Woodward, David Axelrod, one of the close advisers and friends of President Obama, is, for example, described by General Petraeus as an archetypal ‘spin doctor.’[9]

But a real split between the White House and the military leaders appeared in June 2010 with the publication by the magazine Rolling Stones of a long feature article on General McChrystal.[10] With disconcerting candor, the General mentioned his ‘disappointment’ concerning his relations with President Obama. He also made reference to Vice President Biden in terms which are inappropriate and even went so far as to characterise National Security Adviser James Jones as a ‘clown.’[11]. When confronted with the general outcry caused by this article, General McChrystal had no choice but to present his resignation to President Obama, who accepted it.[12]

            w Deep divergences

Besides these quarrels about individuals, relations between the White House and the military leadership were marked by deep divergences. On the question of Afghanistan, General McChrystal, with the support of General Petraeus, defended a strategy of counter-insurgency, taking into account protection of the civilian populations and necessitating the dispatch of at least 40,000 additional soldiers. President Obama was hesitant but did not seem willing to satisfy the two generals, believing that the Pentagon had not given him credible alternatives.  According to Bob Woodward, the president was tempted to thumb his nose at the military by sending just 10,000 additional soldiers for training Afghan armed forces.[13] In the end, in December 2009 he authorised the deployment of 30,000 men but for a limited period, setting the start of withdrawal for the month of July 2011.

Other disagreements appeared over such issues as Libya. The hesitant position of Washington on this point is in fact a reflection of new friction between the Pentagon and the White House, which wanted the military to establish a plan making possible regime change at ‘low cost’ which would not require American intervention with ground forces. This option did not seem very realistic at the Department of Defense. As during the debates over Afghanistan, the White House had the impression that the military was not doing its duty and was not making a proposal that would be ‘politically acceptable’ to the president.[14]

2. Extreme centralisation of decision-making tools

One other specific feature of the Obama administration is the degree of centralisation of power within the White House. Beginning in January 2009, the Washington Post believes that there has been no president since Richard Nixon so committed to forming a team of advisers capable of ‘cut(ting) through the traditional bureaucracy.’[15] A former official of the Pentagon and of the State Department under the Johnson and Carter administrations has even described the decision-making process of this administration as ‘the most centralised’ that he has seen.[16] This tendency is probably inherited from the operations of the presidential campaign of candidate Obama which were shaped by a limited team of close advisers. Most of them, particularly Robert Gibbs, David Axelrod, Mark Lippert and Denis McDonough, later followed Mr. Obama to the White House.

            w Diplomacy

The twenty-eight months of Hillary Clinton at the State Department have highlighted the determination of the White House to exercise close control over the country’s foreign policy. Barack Obama’s nomination of his former rival to head American diplomacy was initially interpreted as a wish to benefit from the stature of the former First Lady on the international scene to promote his ambitious programme. However, the designation of three emissaries in charge of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, of the Middle East and Iran was perceived as a means of controlling the Secretary of State who had, during the Democratic primaries, compared the inexperience of Senator Obama in matters of foreign policy with that of George W. Bush.[17] We note that these three emissaries were in fact attached to the State Department but also to the White House and to the president, whom they were supposed to advise.

In addition, the influence of Mrs. Clinton on the foreign policy of the Obama administration seems relatively limited and she has not until now succeeded in imposing her will on any specific policy area. While the relationship of confidence which she established with Robert Gates enabled her to avoid being isolated, Hillary Clinton was nonetheless confronted with a series of disappointments, such as the transfer of her emissary in charge of Iran, Dennis Ross, to the White House, and the defeat of her candidates to various ambassadorships.[18]

Meanwhile, divergences have appeared between the White House and Mrs. Clinton over the question of the revolts in the Arab world, notably in Egypt. While the American president called for the departure from office of Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak without delay,  Mrs. Clinton and her emissary in Egypt, Frank Wisner, warned against any precipitate action and insisted on the importance of the role of Mr. Mubarak for the transition to proceed in the best conditions.[19] As with the tension which appeared with the military, these dissensions highlighted the profound differences between Mrs. Clinton, who took into account American strategic interests, and the close advisers of Mr. Obama, who added to them political considerations. The advisers wanted in fact that the president support the popular movement so that his position does not contradict the ideas he put forward during his Cairo speech of 2009.[20] Following this episode, Mr. Wisner was pushed aside, because he described the White House as a ‘reelection committee.’[21]

The determination of Mrs. Clinton not to participate in a possible second term of President Obama – and some rumours even suggest a possible still earlier departure from the State Department – has appeared as an indicator of her frustration concerning her relations with the White House.[22]

w Intelligence

The strong tendency to centralisation has also manifested itself in management of intelligence activities. President Obama appointed Leon Panetta to direct the CIA although he had no experience in the area of intelligence because of his support from the time of the Democratic primaries. The presence of this man enjoying the president’s trust at the head of the CIA enabled the White House to get around the traditional bureaucracy represented by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the time, Dennis Blair, by establishing a direct link with the agency in Langley.[23] The consequence was a weakening of the already fragile function of the DNI and real tension between the director of the CIA and the DNI which ended in the firing of Mr. Blair in May 2010.

During the sixteen months of his term in office, Dennis Blair was also confronted with the influence of John O. Brennan, a former adviser to candidate Obama on matters of security who joined the White House staff as Deputy National Security Adviser in charge of homeland security and counter-terrorism. At one point put forward to head the CIA, Mr. Brennan quickly became one of the most influential members of the administration in the development of policy in the areas of intelligence and counter-terrorism. One notes that it was Mr. Brennan – and not the boss of the intelligence community, Mr. Blair – who was sent out to various television stations in the midst of the polemic following the failed terrorist act of Detroit to defend the policy of the Obama administration against critics emanating particularly from the Republican camp.[24] On the occasion of the death of Osama Bin Laden, it was also Mr. Brennan, and not Mr. Panetta or the new DNI James Clapper, who assumed the role of spokesman of the administration concerning this operation.

            w National Security Council

Another illustration of the degree of centralisation was, paradoxically, the marginalisation of the National Security Adviser, General James Jones, who was supposed to coordinate the entire process of developing American policy in this domain. Though the two men hardly knew one another, Barack Obama had asked him to join his team even before the election results were announced. Mr. Obama offered him to become a key member by naming him to the post of National Security Adviser, promising to always consult with him before taking decisions. General Jones accepted, even if as he himself has said, he would have preferred a post more in keeping with his former duties: that of Secretary of State.[25]

In fact he found it very difficult to adapt to the mission of adviser and coordinator. This general, who had spent forty years within the Marine Corps, turned out to be seriously out of step with the functioning of the White House and the president’s young advisers. While the latter kept up the frenetic rhythm of the presidential campaign, General Jones seemed attached to a fixed daily work schedule, going so far as to dedicate a bit of time at midday to engage in one of his favourite pastimes, bicycling. He attributed these differences in how they spent time to a lack of organisation on the part of Mr. Obama’s advisers.[26] At the same time, he was described as someone passive, who ‘attended’ meetings but never ‘led’ [27] them, as his position would have called for.  General Jones was nonetheless aware of the gap which existed, describing himself as an ‘outsider’ and as ‘twenty years older’ than most of his colleagues.[28]

These differences were at the root of the tension between General Jones and the inner circle of President Obama. The National Security Adviser believed he was pushed aside by those close to the president, including his chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, who seemed more in step with General Jones’s deputy, Thomas Donilon. During a presidential trip to Europe, General Jones asked to see Mr. Obama but was subjected to the humiliation of being turned away by a member of the president’s inner circle. The tension later calmed down with most of the members of the president’s entourage, with the exception of Mark Lippert, whom the general suspected of being the source of leaks intended to tarnish his activities.[29] Though President Obama made a gesture of reconciliation by moving aside Mr. Lippert, the inability of General Jones to establish a certain closeness with the president and to integrate himself into the rest of the White House team was fairly clear. The sidelining of General Jones was one of the reasons explaining the high tension which appeared with the military during the debates over Afghanistan which dented the stature of Mr. Obama as commander-in-chief. Aware of this setback, the general took the decision to leave his duties in October 2010.

3. A turning point in the Obama presidency

The series of changes announced at the end of April within the team in charge of national security is undoubtedly a major new stage of the presidency of Mr. Obama. However, we see that it fits within a process having roots earlier than the announcement of 28 April.

            w Rationalisation of the NSC

The White House chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, who was a central figure of the Obama presidency, left his post on 1 October 2010 in order to try to get himself elected as mayor of Chicago.[30] The announcement of this departure opened a second phase in President Obama’s term in office. At the same time, the departure of General Jones became official and the name of his successor, Thomas Donilon, was revealed. This choice illustrated once again the confidence which the president accorded to his entourage and his distrust for outside personalities. Mr. Donilon had joined the election team of candidate Obama in 2008 as adviser on international questions. This former lawyer who was a close associate of Rahm Emanuel had particularly participated in the preparation of candidate Obama for the televised debates.[31] He became the deputy of General Jones.

According to his boss, Mr. Donilon, who had ‘considerable’ organisational abilities, managed to become an ‘indispensable’ element for the president, the other members of the NSC and his staff[32].

The closeness between Mr. Donilon and the president stands out in contrast to the distance which set in between the latter and General Jones. The relationship between Mr. Obama and his new National Security Adviser was put to the test on the occasion of the assault on the  complex of Osama Bin Laden in which Mr. Donilon is credited with having played a ‘key’[33]  role. He is thus expected to contribute to rationalising the functioning of the NSC and strengthening the president’s influence there. One can already suppose that the presence of Mr. Donilon facilitated President Obama’s decision making in the context of the operation against the head of al-Qaeda, when the president faced many options – including  bombardment of the Abbottabad complex– and the skepticism of some members of the team, including Robert Gates, regarding an assault by means of helicopters.[34]

            w A man trusted in the Pentagon

The anticipated departure of Robert Gates during the current year gave the president an opportunity to continue the transformation of his team in charge of national security. Among the names cited by the American press in the spring of 2011, Director of the CIA Leon Panetta very quickly became the favourite to succeed Mr. Gates.[35] His experience as an elected legislator and as former director of the Bureau of the Budget for Bill Clinton constituted a major advantage. In a context of budgetary restrictions, one of the principal missions of the new Secretary of Defense will be the reduction of Pentagon spending. Generally, the relationship of trust established with Mr. Obama – confirmed by the role played by Mr. Panetta in the operation directed against Osama Bin Laden – offered the president the assurance of having at the Department of Defense a loyal ally who can protect him from the ambitions of the military brass, particularly in the prickly matter of Afghanistan.  

Mr. Panetta’s lack of experience in the area of intelligence had encouraged a certain skepticism, but he was ultimately able to produce a positive record as the head of the CIA. He in fact succeeded in restoring a climate of calm within an agency shaken up by a decade of disappointments. He also contributed to strengthening the influence and the weight of the CIA within the intelligence community thanks to his direct relationship with the White House. This enabled him to win many bureaucratic battles with the DNI, who, since the reform of 2004, had replaced the director of the CIA as the boss of the American intelligence community.

In addition, the success of the operation directed against Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan must have considerably improved the morale of the agency and permitted it to regain prestige within the intelligence community and in public opinion. The tracking down of the messengers of the al-Qaeda boss, the identification of the complex in which he was hiding and the supervision of the operation in fact constituted  successes to the credit of the CIA and its director.[36]  We also note that the change in the activities of the CIA, whose paramilitary dimension has developed considerably over these last few years, with numerous attacks of drones, has contributed to blurring the boundary between the clandestine activities of an intelligence service and special operations conducted by the armed forces.[37] This experience should facilitate the integration of Mr. Panetta within the Department of Defense. Officially named to the Pentagon just several days before the assault of 2 May, Leon Panetta will take up his duties as Secretary of Defense in July basking in prestige which will be a major plus for President Obama.

The position of Mr. Obama vis-à-vis the military will surely also be strengthened in coming months with the probable nomination of General James Cartwright to the post Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Marine, who is described as President Obama’s favourite general[38], will replace Admiral Michael Mullen, who aroused the ire of the White House by his unfailing support for the strategy on Afghanistan recommended by Generals McChrystal and Petraeus.

            w Keeping a potential adversary busy

As replacement for Mr. Panetta at the CIA, President Obama decided to name the head of military operations in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, who was expected to leave his post in the autumn.  He will now give up his uniform and assume his duties at Langley in the month of September. His experience in the domain of counter-insurgency in Iraq and in Afghanistan is a serious advantage for the paramilitary activities of the Agency in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Besides his familiarity with the main theatres of operation, General Petraeus is also well informed about intelligence. When he directed CENTCOM, the command responsible for American military operations from Egypt to Pakistan, he created a division devoted to intelligence.[39] The task which awaits him at Langley will nonetheless be more complex. Indeed, General Petraeus will face major challenges such as management of the budget of the Agency, of its relations with the rest of the community, particularly with the  DNI, and the diplomatic dimension of the post of director of the CIA.  With respect to this last point, his good knowledge of the chiefs of the Pakistani military will be valuable for reestablishing a semblance of trust between the CIA and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence).

For President Obama, the nomination of General Petraeus to the CIA presents a certain number of advantages. While his departure from the post of commander of operations in Afghanistan was anticipated, he is expected to increase the president’s margin for manœuvre in the Afghan case, where withdrawal should begin in July. The general’s military career had served to prepare him for other prestigious duties within the military leadership such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has as one of its missions to serve as adviser to the president. Given the divergences which have appeared between these two men over Afghan strategy, the nomination of General Petraeus to head the CIA allows Mr. Obama to limit his influence on this policy issue while offering him a major operational role through the CIA’s operations in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. For the president, this decision also has the benefit of keeping the general within his team, preventing him from becoming an outside critic of the administration’s actions.

Finally, this nomination limits the chances of our seeing General Petraeus run for the presidency in 2012 as the candidate of the Republican Party. Although the general had already excluded the possibility of standing as a candidate, this prospect still remained a source of anxiety for the White House.[40]

4. Conclusion

Like a number of his predecessors, Barack Obama arrived at the White House without much experience in matters relating to national security. Given the major importance of these issues, he chose to exercise prudence by surrounding himself with an experienced team. In this respect, he imitated President George W. Bush, who also put in place a team composed of former Secretaries of  State Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, as well as former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell. In the two cases, we see that the president became a hostage to the divisions of his cabinet and had a relatively limited margin for  manœuvre.

Concerning the management of international affairs, the initial phase of Mr. Obama’s term in office was marked by a lack of trust which quickly emerged between him and his advisers on the one hand, and the military leadership, on the other hand. On this point, the experience of his National Security Adviser James Jones and of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was not a great help to him since they in fact did not play their role of moderator. That contributed to the emergence of a foreign policy lacking in clarity, particularly with regard to Afghanistan and to the revolts in the Arab world. It also contributed to forming the image of an indecisive president.

The reshuffle which took place in April should bring greater coherence to President Obama’s policies.  It may be characterised as a strengthening of the degree of centralisation of the administration’s operations and of the margin for manœuvre of both the president and the White House. The arrival of Thomas Donilon at the post of National Security Adviser and of Leon Panetta at the Pentagon may be expected to unblock the process of developing foreign, defense and security policy of the United States. Combined with the personal success which the death of Osama Bin Laden represents, this reshuffle demonstrates the assertion of President Obama as commander-in-chief and thereby opens a new stage of his presidency.

Nevertheless, this enhanced consistency is not necessarily a guarantee of effectiveness. This comfortable and much more consensual environment could turn out to be risky for a president whose experience remains thin. Mr. Obama should do more to widen the range of positions which will be presented to him in order to test the relevance of his options and avoid the pitfall of too great politicisation of his actions as the 2012 election draws near. From this point of view, the place of Hillary Clinton, who has been weakened by the departure of her main ally, Robert Gates, and who thereby risks being marginalised, will tell us a lot about the level of pluralism within the new administration.

© ESISC 2011