Do recent changes in Russia's military machine spell the country's return as a major power ?



In the course of his annual three-hour televised encounter with his Russian compatriots on October 18, Vladimir Putin took his time dealing with questions of defence. Just a short time before the legislative elections (which took place on December 2, 2007) and several months away from the Presidential elections scheduled for March 2008, the message he intended to deliver to his people and to the world was clear: the Russian Army is expected to quickly return to the rank it held several years ago.


President Putin said that Russia has plans for developing its Army which are ‘not just grand, but grandiose,’ [1] including ‘entirely new’ systems of nuclear missiles. He also asserted that military service would be reduced from a year and a half to one year beginning on January 1, 2008 and he announced the signing of a decree increasing military pensions by 40 billion  rubles (1.1 billion Euros).  These statements were not just intended to gather votes in the run-up to major elections but fit into a forceful policy of renewing Russia’s military machine.


1997, when the Russian Army was in total chaos[2]


‘ The Soviet period presented the world with the image of a powerful Army, both in terms of  volume and in terms of fire power, and also one that was efficient due to the central place it occupied in the economy of the country: the military-industrial complex constituted then the most high-performance sector of the Soviet economy. This image was broken as a result of Glasnost, which revealed the dysfunctional side of the military industrial sector and, as a result of what followed, the decaying state of the Soviet armed forces.’ [3]Economic crisis rendered attempts at reforming the bloated Army impossible. Budgetary cuts which came more rapidly than the reforms aimed at reducing staff aggravated the impoverishment of the institution.

The consequences were dramatic: in the 1990s, the Russian Army became ‘an army that was poorly fed, poorly lodged, disoriented, turned into drunkards and abandoned, an army which no longer had as its objective to maintain its fighting capacity but just to subsist by any and all means. Its officers were busy trying to feed themselves and feed their troops, and they were no longer able to ensure the traditional missions that were incumbent on them. Education and training stopped, practically speaking. Recruitment was a disaster and the military schools were deserted.’ [4]

The increase in criminality within the Army was substantial: pillaging, the sale of equipment and munitions, all multiplied. The instinct for survival seemed to become the rule in the Army, which lost a number of its points of reference as well as its spirit of discipline.


In these circumstances, an Army operating at ‘various speeds’ came into being. At some distance from the regular Army, which was practically abandoned, there was another – or more properly speaking, several armies: the army of the other so-called ‘power’ ministries and some elite troops. These became the object of special attention in a government wishing to protect itself. Dividing things up to be better protected was the policy. ‘The emergence of new forces such as the Presidential Guard, the Cossacks, the numerical reinforcement of the police forces and border troops all came about while the regular forces were being reduced. Meanwhile the flagrantly contradictory statements of many generals became apparent. The state authorities protected themselves from the Army thanks to the other Armed Forces, thereby creating new relations between organisations within the midst of these very same Armed Forces.’ [5]


The difficult context of Perestroika


The profound crisis that the Soviet Army underwent and that the Russian Army inherited at its official creation on May 7, 1992 became public knowledge thanks to Perestroika. The structural failures of the military organisation, the poor treatment inflicted on young recruits, the bad living conditions of officers and their families were all put up for public inspection. In reality, the economic crisis and then the disappearance of the Empire merely accentuated a much older illness.


Relying on expert reports, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski states in her article that the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defence theoretically could only pay for an Army of 650,000 to 700,000 men, whereas the Russian Army had 1,700,000 in 1995. In 1994, the Ministry needed a bare minimum of 55 trillion rubles, but it received 37, which was later revised upward to 40.6. In 1995, the Ministry of Finance simply failed to pay the amounts shown in the budget law, which led the commanders of units to find the means of financing themselves on their own. The result was salaries ravaged by inflation, delays in payment of soldiers’ pay that reached 3 to 6 months in the best of cases, difficulties feeding the troops (cases of  malnutrition were cited in certain regions and the ‘war reserves’ were used) and equipping them (notably with respect to winter uniforms).


The following account of a sergeant appeared in the Los Angeles Times (January 1996): ‘The Russian soldiers were sent into combat (in Chechnya) with inadequate rations, without gloves, without spare clothing, without toilet paper ; the men were in a permanent state of hunger, cold and  extreme fatigue.’ [6]


 ‘From an operational point of view, the Army is in a pitiful state. Fuel is lacking, the training period was reduced to the minimum. For example, the pilots’ annual flying time was reduced from 100 to 30 hours. Moreover,  35% of the helicopters were grounded for lack of spare parts. According to military sociologists, 70% of the commanders said in 1994 that their unit could not fight properly. According to a report by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Armed Forces were unable to fight outside the CIS. Out of 81 ground divisions, 51 were not combat ready. [7]


A divorce consummated between the military and politicians


Though the Russian Army did not rebel, it did growl. In 1993, one third of its votes went to the populist candidate Zhirinovsky. Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski mentions the figures given in the newspaper Moscow News on December 18, 1993: 72% of the staff of the strategic forces voted for Zhirinovsky. Seventy-four percent and 87% of the elite Taman and Kantemirov divisions respectively voted for Zhirinovsky, who garnered 46% of the votes in the Moscow Military Region. In 1994, the President was supported by just one officer in five. The Presidential elections confirmed this disavowal: the military votes went to Zhirinovsky as well as to General Lebed.


Quit, survive by all means or work for the restoration of the institution


Unlike the lower ranking officers and non-commissioned officers, most of the senior officers could not envisage leaving the Army. After a life dedicated to the institution, their reorientation in some other profession was hard to entertain. The only alternative for them was to restore the military institution. This restoration came about as a result of the entrance into politics of a certain number of officers who were convinced that in order to act efficiently they had to be able to control the budget and its allocation.


Beginning in 1993, the strategy of the Ministry of Defence consisted in getting military officers into Parliament so as to create a pressure group and obtain more funding. This behaviour seems to have been motivated by three concerns: firstly, the Army wanted to have an influence on political-military decisions; secondly, the Army wanted to be able to act at the legislative level and fundamentally change its situation; and thirdly, the Army wanted to ensure that its ‘interests and [those] of the country were guaranteed within the framework of reforming the State.’


During the December 1995 elections, 123 military men (including 23 generals) were ‘knighted’ by the Ministry. The Army’s attempt to enter Parliament enjoyed only relative success and their dispersal among various electoral lists was the reality. Though the hope of obtaining a homogeneous group was quite weak, the interest of this military participation in the elections nonetheless remained important for the politicians since each general had his supporters in the Army.


When he said that the disappearance of the Soviet Union was the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century,[8] Vladimir Putin no doubt expressed what a large number of Russians and the majority of the military were thinking. The military rallied to Putin, who praised the feeling of rediscovered pride and who wants to place the Russia of today in the continuum of a great Russian fatherland.

 ‘Believing that Russia cannot solve the enormous tasks of developing the State without the Army, Vladimir Putin wants to redeploy the Army and seeks to establish mutual confidence between it and the citizens.’ [9]

After years in the wilderness, the Army found itself once again in its place – in the bosom of the nation. ‘One of the unconditional priorities is the reinforcement of all aspects of our Armed Forces,’ [10]Putin said in the summer of 2007 when speaking to newly promoted senior officers.


To become a major strategic power once again


The arrival of Vladimir Putin as head of the RussianState coincided with a clear-cut hardening of the military policy of the country. The country had become aware of its relative weakness compared to the other major powers and of its vulnerability to separatist movements and so it undertook the vast work of modernising its forces. Even before the first months in the Kremlin had gone by, he decreed an increase of 50% in the spending on equipment for the Russian Army.[11] There was here a wish to raise up the Russian Army that was never denied.

‘ We should be ready to counter any attempt at putting pressure on Russia when positions are strengthened at our own cost … The stronger our Army becomes, the smaller the temptations will be to apply pressure on us,’ [12] Vladimir Putin said on May, 10, 2006.


To be listened to once again


Russia wants to be listened to once again on the international stage. The resumption of permanent flights of the Russian strategic air forces that was decided upon in August is not viewed by Dmitri Trenin[13] as an escalation towards a Cold War. Rather it is a question of getting more attention from the United   States. ‘ The unipolar world does not exist even theoretically, and strategic military pluralism is a reality in the skies as it is elsewhere.’ [14]

Intent on regaining for the country a part of the luster of the past even as its strategic position is  weakened by the enlargement of NATO and the military initiatives of the United States, the Russian President proposes to re-concentrate the defence apparatus on priorities, meaning domestic threats, the borders, reinforcing nuclear arms and developing the means of cooperation and  diplomacy.’ [15]


To modify and modernise the military machine


The desire is to provide the Russian forces with a capability comparable to that of NATO and to give it units for projecting force. This spells the end of the big battalions inherited from the Cold War. The troops no longer have the task of engaging in the types of battle coming down to us from the Second World War. Rather, they should be able to engage simultaneously in a high intensity conflict (such as ‘Desert Storm’) and in to medium intensity conflicts (such as assistance to a former Soviet republic in the Caucasus having border problems[16]).  To sum up: to acquire forces in a format that is smaller but more operational. The effort extends to recasting the forces around a higher professionalism and a tangible reduction in staff, which will be reduced by a factor of four in the course of twenty years. The USSR had between 4 and 5 million soldiers and there were a bit more than 2 million in 1994 when Russia went to war in Chechnya. Today the headcount in all of the Armed Forces is a bit more than 1 million men. Expenditures grew by 23% in 2007 and they have risen by 69% since 2003. Russian military expenditures are estimated to be more than 60 billion dollars in 2007, i.e., nearly 4% of GDP (5% of GDP for the United   States, which allocates 623 billion dollars to the Defence budget).[17]


In March 2007,  Minister of Defence Ivanov announced that 50% of the  Defence budget will be spent on programmes of new intercontinental missiles, new generation tactical missiles (‘more than 50% of the missiles in service in the Russian Army are obsolete.’ [18]), the acquisition of strategic bombers, the renewal of the ground-to-air defence system and new armoured vehicles and troop transports. Some 40% of the vehicular fleet will be replaced by 2015.[19]

 ‘In accordance with the State programme on arms to the year 2015, there are plans to equip the troops with more than 30 launch silos and command posts, as well as with 50 underground and  mobile Topol-Ms (a missile which can carry a combat payload of 1.2 tonnes more than 10,000 km). The fleet of missile-carrying  Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft will be enlarged to 50 units. Nuclear powered submarines carrying Bulava missiles will be produced in series. The rearmament will include 40 battalions of armoured vehicles, 97 motorised infantry battalions and 50 airborne battalions. Five terrestrial Army missile brigades  will be equipped with ultra-modern Iskander-M missiles, and 2 artillery regiments will get modernised Uragan-1M multiple rocket launchers. Some 5,000 billion rubles (nearly 45 billion Euros) will be allocated to the arms programme up to the year 2015.’ [20]


A new strategic order


As Alexei G. Arbatov[21], who presides over the Duma’s Defence Committee,  very correctly emphasises: ‘it has been a long time since the Moscow Military District last constituted the front line of our defence zone. (…) In order to meet this new challenge, the new Russian Army should be unique and innovative.’ As the heir to Soviet thinking, Moscow is obsessed with having strategic breathing room. The Americans’ political and military advances in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the ‘coloured revolutions’ (orange and rose) in the Ukraine and in Georgia, have all added to the Russians’ sense of insecurity. Using the argument of a threat coming from Iran, America is installing a missile defence shield at sites in Poland the the Czech Republic and this is felt as the ultimate provocation. This deployment near the Russian border is felt by Moscow to be a threat to its national security.  The Russian military theoretician Makhmut Gareev, President of the Academy of Military   Sciences, favours a tougher posture with regard to the West. He claims for Russia the right of preemptive nuclear strike in order to prevent a large-scale aggression.  Moreover, he justifies this position saying that Russia is unable to defend its soil against superior NATO troops.[22] 


Former President Mikhail Gorbachev actively supports the current President in his attempt to restore the State. ‘ Now Russia is raising its head,’ he says. ‘Its absence in the major international discussions has been cruelly felt. It is in the interest of the entire world that Russia return to the international stage and Russia is showing itself capable of doing so. Among the serious elites, no one speaks of the rebirth of an empire. But we have the calling to remain a great power, a stable and trustworthy partner.‘ [23]


Some problems to be solved


In 1996, the terrestrial Army numbered 670,000 men, of which 290,000 were officers, i.e., 43%[24] of the total manpower. This is a very high percentage compared to Western armies and speaks of not giving much authority to non-officer staff, an inheritance of the Soviet military. These officers are too young to go into retirement or too old to change professions for civilian life and they pose one of the most important problems in personnel management for the Chiefs of Staff to handle.


The ‘dedovshchina’ [25]


Two hundred ten thousand conscripts are in the Army and are performing a military service that has become more and more unpopular since the 1990s. The problems are real: only about 9% of young people of the age to do their military service come forward to the enlistment offices. Some 12,500 of them go into hiding each year to avoid their military obligations and only 1.6% of them are taken to court. [26]  Pay of less than one dollar per month and the disastrous effects of the dedovshchina, a hazing practice that was denounced during Perestroika but seems to be rising again after several years of respite, are largely responsible for this state of affairs. The whole military institution is discredited, and its prestige has fallen sharply. Between 1985 and 1990, there were between 6,000 and 10,000 deaths within the Army under ‘suspicious circumstances’ – that are attributable to the dedovshchina. One can add to this number the 6 to 8% of suicides among recruits each year. The Russian Ministry of Defence has confirmed the death of more than 300 soldiers since the beginning of the year.[27] The families rarely know the true reasons of the death. The statement “Died while carrying out his duties” is often the only explanation given to them. According to the newspaper Moscow News, this practice has not disappeared despite media criticism during Perestroika. Today the media simply give it less attention.


Nowadays the Army continues to suffer from multiple deficiencies which affect the ability of units to remain in an operational state: the morale of soldiers, who are still badly paid and badly housed, remains low; insubordination is latent and the level of suicide is very troubling.


A reform process that is difficult to implement


Public opinion seems to want to maintain the process of reform desired by the authorities, meaning orientation towards greater professionalism of the Armed Forces. In January 2002, Vladimir Putin said he wanted to stress professionalism to the point of giving up the draft. This operation generates high costs: making two divisions totaling 50,000 men into fully professional units would officially cost $586 million dollars, i.e., 3 % of the Defence budget for 2005.[28] The immensity of the Russian territory involves the deployment of large contingents.  These factors risk sinking the project.


The development of the Russian Army will be limited by the economic capacities of the country. Andrei Neshchadin, deputy directeur of the ‘Social-Conservative Club,’ a think tank close to the United Russia party of President Putin, emphasises that oil revenues will not be enough to modernise the Russian Army. The petrodollars will not be sufficient: ‘we produce 3 tonnes/habitant, whereas Norway produces 20 tonnes,’ he has said.[29] This is a clever way to prepare the population for sacrifices necessary to face up to the deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic, a threat felt in Moscow in the same way as during the crisis in Cuba.[30]

An arms merchant looking for new markets

Russia was a major exporter of arms during the Soviet period.  After several years of relative self-effacement, Russia is now going after new markets. Encouragement is being given to arms exports in order to enjoy economies of scale, reduce unit costs, limit the financial risks, and also to support foreign policy and counter the foreign policy of the United States.

In the year 2000, the Russian military budget was just 6 billion dollars compared to the 250 to 300 billion being spent at the start of the 1980s. Military production has fallen by 80%.[31] Whereas the Soviet Union produced 1,600 tanks in 1990, Russia only produced 5 during 1997. In the same interval, the production of bombers went from 430 to 70.[32]

Military industry owes its survival in large part to exports, because the orders of the Russian Army have been reduced. As a sign of the newfound vitality and conquering spirit arising from diplomatic and commercial plans, Russian arms exports and defence materiel broke the records in 2006, reaching 6.5 billion dollars of sales, i.e., nearly 20% more than anticipated.[33] The stated goal for 2007 is 7.5 billion dollars. For its part, the The New York Times[34] estimates that Russian revenue reached 8.1 billion dollars, with 28.1% market share.


Russia enlarges the geographic scope of its arms deliveries


 ‘The circle of our partners gets bigger and bigger. Whereas two years ago, our company cooperated with 60 foreign countries, today they are now 80,’ [35]the director of the state enterprise Rosoboronexport has said. Exports are really diversified and have increased in  volume. Though the share of the two traditional customers of Russia, India and China, has gone down, nonetheless India still continues to buy massively in Russia and is even developing with the country a new hypersonic  missile operating at a speed at least five times faster than sound, which renders it practically invulnerable to any interceptor missile attack.[36]

The delivery of combat airplanes occupies a major part of these exports[37] : 12 SU-30 fighter planes to Venezuela (The New York Times announced a delivery of 24 SU-30 to this country[38]), 12 SU-30 fighter planes to Malaysia, 6 to Algeria, 22 to India (as well as 40 fighters assembled under license and 140 sold in 2000), 10 MIG 29 to China are among the significant numbers.

During these past few years, Russia has become one of the biggest suppliers of arms to countries in Latin America, which were traditionally an American preserve. Between 2002 and 2005, Russia supplied 300 million dollars worth of arms to Venezuela, to Argentina, to Peru, to Brazil, to Cuba, to Columbia and to Mexico.[39]

The major sales of arms to Venezuela worry Washington. With the signing of contracts having a value of around 3 billion dollars in 2005-2006, Venezuela figures among the five biggest purchasers of Russian arms (submarines, DCA system, ground-based weapons).[40] The New York Times wonders, for example, about the purchase of 5,000 Dragunov rifles (a weapon intended for sharpshooters) and 100,000 AK-103 submachine guns (modernised Kalashnikovs) by a country with only 34,000 soldiers and 23,000 National Guardsmen.[41]


Other countries which maintain tense relations with the United States are pampered by Russia. By its purchase of more than 2.2 billion dollars (acquisition of ground-to-air missile systems, 12 Su-30MK2 fighters and 12 MIG 29s, plus one or two submarines), Libya could  figure among the ten main customers of Russia.[42]  Syria has signed a contract estimated to be worth one billion dollars for the delivery of 5 MIG-31E fighter planes and a shipment of MIG-29/M2. Syria has in recent years also received anti-tank missiles, RPG-29 grenade launchers, some ground-to-air missile systems and a contract whereby Russia will modernise 1,000  T-72 tank (concluded in 2006).[43]  Meanwhile Algeria is presently negotiating the purchase of naval vessels, Su-32 fighter bombers, Mi-28 helicopters, missiles and T-90 tanks, with the expected conclusion of contracts scheduled for 2007-2008.[44]


No doubt in the desire to diversify their sources of supply, some Gulf States have also turned to Moscow to buy certain materials. Thus, Moscow is negotiating with Saudi Arabia over the delivery of T-90 tanks and armoured vehicles for a total sum of around 1 billion dollars.[45] The  United Arab Emirates placed an order for military materiel worth 40 million dollars at the last international fair in Abu-Dhabi.[46]


‘One of the things that you have to reckon with most often in dealing with nations just as with individuals is self-esteem.’ [47]


Russia has set about restoring its status as a major power in a world that is once again multi--polar. It believes that the Americans took advantage of the state of decay it was in to encircle it (the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to include the former fraternal countries, the  installation of the missile defence shield in Poland and the CzechRepublic).

‘We are back. We have money and we are key actors. You will need us to solve problems and if you do not want our support, we will be able to hold up the solution of certain problems,’ [48] Vladimir Putin has said.  Russia has also warned that it will ‘neutralise’ the missile defence shield if it is put in service in Eastern Europe and has threatened to withdraw from the Treaty on Intermediary Nuclear Forces (INF), a major treaty inherited from the Cold War. The Russian President does not speak lightly. On July 14, he already signed a decree suspending the application by Russia of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)[49] and the international accords linked to it.

‘Today and probably for the first time since the 18th century, Russia is surrounded by countries that are developing their military potential more actively than it is. Even Turkey has armed forces comparable to Russia’s and probably even superior. This is why nuclear arms are in the final analysis our last resort,’ [50]Konstantin Makivenko, the Vice Director of the Russian Centre for Strategic Analysis said in 2000.


The stakes are to avoid being marginalised and to find an assymetrical response in the absence of being able to rival the Americans. Two conflicting theses emerge. For some, ‘ the rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and the budgetary efforts associated with it describe an optimal result desired over the long term, while the present investments are intended to look after the sectors that are most deficient and to rebuild a capability for minimal intervention.’ [51]

A more alarmist statement comes from a highly placed diplomat. Even if Vladimir Putin is ready for dialogue, ‘We are watching the return of the Russia of the Tsars. The Russians are not presenting a real military threat, but this is the return of a diplomacy of force and no one knows what can emerge.’ [52]


Russia has a thousand-year history. It has been a great country following in the footsteps of Peter the Great and Catherine II. It would be a mistake to want to deny this and to restrict this country to its geographic borders. The rearmament and change underway in its defence machinery may just be an expression of Russia’s wish to be reintegrated into the concert of  nations and to be restored to its proper place.



Copyright © ESISC 2008

[1] Piotr SMOLAR, ‘Vladimir Putin is vague about his future as President,’ Le Monde Week-end, October 20, 2007.

[2] Elisabeth SIECA-KOZLOWSKI, ‘The Russian Army: strategies for survival and individual and joint modalities of action in a situation of ‘chaos,’’ Cultures & Conflits n°24-25 1997 pp. 99-133.

[3] Idem p.99

[4] Ibid p.100

[5] Ibid  p.100

[6] Ibid  p.102

[7] Ibid  p.103

[8] Cited by Serge SUR, ‘Russia in movement,’ p.4, in ‘International Questions - Russia n°27,  September-October 2007.

[9] Ibid, Jacques FONTANEL, p.582

[10] ‘In the face of growing threats, the consolidation of the Armed Forces is a priority for Russia,’ RIA Novosti, July 25, 2007.

[11] Vicken CHETERIAN, ‘The Russian Army in Search of Reform.’  The Diplomatic World [ Le Monde diplomatique], September 2000.

[12] Pascal MARCHAND, Geopolitical Atlas of Russia, Editions Autrement publishing house, 2007, p. 9.

[13] Dmitri TRENIN, ‘ Strategic Simulation,’ CarnegicMoscowCenter, source The New Times, August 27, 2007.

[14] ‘With the return of the old bombers, Russia returns to the international arena,’ RIA Novosti,  August 2, 2007.

[15] Jacques FONTANEL, ‘Russian military expenditures at the start of the 21st century,’  French Yearbook of International Relations [Annuaire français de relations internationals], AFRI, volume IV, p.582.

[16] Alexei G. ARBATOV, ‘The Russian Military in the 21st Century,’ Strategic Studies Institute of the USArmyWarCollege, 1997, 19 p., p. 10.

[17] Laurent ZECCHINI, ‘ The awakening of the Russian Army,’  Le Monde, September 20, 2007.

[18] ‘Ground-air missiles Tor-M2 and Buk-M3 will be delivered to the Russian Army in 2008 and 2009,’ RIA Novosti, September 21, 2007.

[19] ‘Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising Military Doctrine,’ Radio Free Europe, March 12, 2007.

[20] ‘Military command : choice of priority arms for the three future military branches,’ Rossiiskaya Gazeta in RIA Novosti,  September 12, 2007.

[21]  Alexei G. ARBATOV, Idem, p. 7.

[22] ‘Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising Military Doctrine,’ Radio Free Europe,  March 12, 2007.

[23] Mikhal GORBACHEV, ‘Putine has brought Russia out of chaos,’  L’Express n°2940 dated November 8 – 14, 2007.

[24] John PIKE, ‘ Russian Army-Overview,’  Global, August 20,  2007.

[25] Dedovshchina is a term which covers  the cruel practices of superiors  or those with greater seniority in the service towards young recruits which can lead to rape or to murder.

[26] ‘ Military Looks to Tackle Draft-Dodging,’ Moscow News n°39 2007,  October 4, 2007.

[27] ‘3000 Russian Soldiers die in Noncombat Deaths,’ Radio Free Europe, September 20, 2007.

Incomplete statistics, the death of soldiers serving in other ministries (Interior, FSB, etc.) are not taken into account.

[28] Stéphane DELORY, ‘The transformation of the Russian defence system,’  French Yearbook of International Relations [Annuaire français de relations internationals], AFRI, volume VII.

[29]  ‘Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising Military Doctrine,’ Radio Free Europe,  March 12, 2007.

[30] ‘ Putin compares US Shield to Cuba,’ BBC News, October 26, 2007.

[31] Idem,Vicken CHETERIAN.

[32] The Military Balance, 1999-2000, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, OxfordUniversity Press, 1999.

[33] ‘Russian arms exports in 2006 break records,’ RIA Novosti, March 20, 2007.

[34] Thom SHANKER, ‘U.S. is Top Arms Seller to Developing World,’ The New York Times,  October 1, 2007.

[35] ‘ Russia enlarges the geographic scope of its military aircraft deliveries,’ RIA Novosti, August 20, 2007.

[36] ‘Russia and India develop a new hypersonic missile,’ RIA Novosti, September 24,  2007.

[37] ‘ Rosoboronexport:  going from  record to records,’  RIA Novosti, October 1, 2007.

[38] Idem, Thom SHANKER.

[39] ‘Arms sales: Russia has ousted the United States in Latin American markets,’ RIA Novosti, March 22, 2007.

[40] ‘The visit of Hugo Chavez to Russia can exert a negative influence on relations between Moscow-Washington,’ RIA Novosti, June 27 , 2007.

[41] C.J. CHIVERS,  ‘Chavez’s Bid for Russian Arms Pains U.S. ,’  New York Times, August 16,  2007.

[42]Libya will purchase Russian arms for more than de 2.2 billion dollars,’ RIA Novosti,  May 4, 2007.

[43] ‘Moscow resumes arms deliveries in the Near East,’  RIA Novosti,  June 19, 2007.

[44]  ‘Arms sales: a promising Russian order book, but… », RIA Novosti,  March 29, 2007.

[45] ‘Moscow expects to export certain arms to the Middle East,’ RIA Novosti, July 31, 2007.

[46] ‘Arms sales: Russia ousts the United States from ths American markets,’ RIA Novosti,  February 2 1, 2007.

[47] Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, 3 volumes, Hachette, 1881-1889.

[48] ‘The rise in power of the Russian Army arouses disquiet in the USA,’  7 sur 7,  October 25, 2007.

[49] ‘Putin suspends the application by Russia of the CFE Treaty,’ RIA Novosti, July  14, 2007.

The CFE established an equilibrium of conventional forces in Europe and excluded a surprise strike. It limited the deployment in Europe of tanks, heavy artillery, airplanes and helicopters.

[50] Ibid Vicken CHETERIAN.

[51] Idem, Stéphane DELORY.

[52] Idem, Laurent ZECCHINI.

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